Analysis of PCA Logs on a Compromised Windows 11 Workstation

Windows Forensics

Executive Summary

Following indicators of a credential compromise and unauthorized remote access (RDP) targeting a QA Engineer’s Windows 11 workstation, a preliminary forensic triage was conducted using Program Compatibility Assistant (PCA) execution artifacts located in C:\Windows\appcompat\pca\.

Analysis of PcaAppLaunchDic.txt and PcaGeneralDb0.txt identified a concentrated post-exploitation activity window on 2026-04-08 between 11:30:26 UTC and 11:43:38 UTC under the user profile cyberjunkie. Within this 13-minute window, an unauthorized operator downloaded and installed 7-Zip (7z2600-x64.exe), staged/executed Rclone (rclone.exe), interactively launched the 7-Zip File Manager (7zFM.exe) to archive files, opened Windows Terminal (WindowsTerminal.exe), and subsequently installed and ran Eraser (Eraser.exe) to securely wipe local traces.

Background & Artifact Overview: Windows Program Compatibility Assistant (PCA)

What are PCA Logs?

The Program Compatibility Assistant (PcaSvc) is a built-in Windows service designed to detect and mitigate compatibility issues when applications run on modern versions of Windows. Starting in Windows 10 and continuing in Windows 11, Windows writes plain-text execution telemetry to C:\Windows\appcompat\pca\. Because these files persist independently of Windows Event Logs and Prefetch, they frequently preserve proof of program execution even after an attacker deletes their binaries or attempts anti-forensic cleanup.n

Three primary files reside in C:\Windows\appcompat\pca\:

  1. PcaAppLaunchDic.txt: A pipe-delimited (|) dictionary mapping full executable paths to their last recorded UTC execution/event timestamp.
  2. PcaGeneralDb0.txt: A pipe-delimited database recording detailed execution events, including record type codes, PE version metadata (Product Name, Company Name, Product Version), a PCA Program ID, and exit/resolver status messages.
  3. PcaGeneralDb1.txt: A secondary/rotated database sharing the exact same schema as PcaGeneralDb0.txt. Both Db0 and Db1 should always be parsed together to ensure complete coverage.

    Forensic Analysis & Findings

1. Deployment of File Archiving Utility

Examination of PcaAppLaunchDic.txt revealed that an installer for 7-Zip (7z2600-x64.exe) was staged in the user’s Downloads directory and executed on 2026-04-08 11:30:37

7-Zip Installer in PcaAppLaunchDic.txt

Correlating this binary in PcaGeneralDb0.txt shows how the installation unfolded across three distinct records:

  • 2026-04-08 11:30:26.117 UTC (Type 2): 7z2600-x64.exe logged Abnormal process exit with code 0x1—a non-zero exit code indicating the initial installer run terminated prematurely or encountered an error.
  • 2026-04-08 11:30:26.150 UTC (Type 0): 33 milliseconds later, PCA recorded Installer failed.
  • 2026-04-08 11:30:39.242 UTC (Type 3): Following a second execution recorded in PcaAppLaunchDic.txt at 11:30:37.758 UTC, PCA logged PCA resolve is called, resolver name: DetectorShim_KernelDriver, result: 0, confirming Windows evaluated the successful second run of the installer.

7-Zip Installer Exit, Failure, and PCA Resolve Entries

With 7-Zip installed at 11:30:39 UTC, the next step in the activity window was staging a tool capable of moving data off the host.

What Does “PCA Resolve is Called” Mean?

When PcaSvc logs PCA resolve is called (Type 3) with DetectorShim_KernelDriver and result: 0, Windows’ compatibility engine has evaluated the binary against built-in compatibility detectors/shims without internal error (0 = STATUS_SUCCESS). In DFIR timelines, Type 3 entries serve as reliable corroborating evidence of program execution around the logged timestamp.

2. Staging of Cloud Exfiltration Utility

Shortly after the 7-zip installation, logs indicate the execution of rclone.exe at 11:32:00, from an extracted archive folder inside Downloads, followed by WindowsTerminal.exe at 11:40:16, 7zFM.exe at 11:37:07 and the Eraser Binary:

Rather than running in a single automated script, the attacker appears to have interactively staged tools under the Downloads folder and tested or launched them manually during the session. Notice also that PcaAppLaunchDic.txt lists entries in the order PCA last updated/wrote them rather than strictly sorted by timestamp (for instance, WindowsTerminal.exe at 11:40:16 appears above 7zFM.exe at 11:37:07), which is why analysts should always sort by timestamp when reconstructing an event sequence while keeping in mind that PcaAppLaunchDic.txt tracks the last recorded launch time for each path.

Why rclone.exe is a High-Priority DFIR Indicator

rclone.exe is the binary for Rclone, a legitimate open-source command-line tool designed to sync, copy, and transfer files between local directories and cloud storage providers (such as MEGA, Google Drive, OneDrive, and AWS S3). Threat actors routinely abuse Rclone for data exfiltration because outbound HTTPS traffic to reputable cloud storage endpoints blends easily with legitimate enterprise network traffic.

Looking closely at %USERPROFILE%\Downloads\rclone-v1.73.3-windows-amd64\rclone.exe (product rclone, version 1.73.3) in PcaGeneralDb0.txt shows two entries at 11:32:08 UTC:

  • 2026-04-08 11:32:08 UTC (Type 2): Abnormal process exit with code 0x1
  • 2026-04-08 11:32:08 UTC (Type 3): PCA resolve is called, resolver name: DetectorShim_KernelDriver, result: 0

Because Rclone is a command-line utility, invoking it without proper CLI arguments or terminating/killing the process produces a non-zero exit (0x1) at 2026-04-08 11:32:08 UTC. Once the Rclone binary was in place, the session shifted to gathering and archiving files.

3. Data Collection & Archiving via 7zFM.exe

Following the initial Rclone execution, C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7zFM.exe appears at 11:37:07, and PcaGeneralDb0.txt records a Type 3 (PCA resolve is called) entry for %programfiles%\7-Zip\7zFM.exe at 11:40:03:

7-Zip File Manager PCA Resolve Entry

This highlights the rclone.exe entries at 11:32:08 alongside the later 7zFM.exe PCA resolve at 11:40:03. The embedded PE metadata confirms legitimate product and publisher strings for both tools, rclone (https://rclone.org, version 1.73.3) and 7-zip (igor pavlov, version 26.00), ruling out simple binary renaming on those executables and showing that interactive archiving was evaluated right before the command-line activity that followed.

Interactive Archiving (7zFM.exe vs. 7z.exe)

Unlike 7z.exe (the command-line archiver typically favored in automated scripts), 7zFM.exe is the graphical user interface (GUI) file manager. Its presence points toward an operator interactively browsing directories over RDP and compressing target files into an archive, reducing transfer size and bundling sensitive data prior to exfiltration.

Temporal Proximity Analysis

Comparing the initial PcaAppLaunchDic.txt entry for 7zFM.exe (2026-04-08 11:37:07 UTC) against its subsequent PcaGeneralDb0.txt entry (2026-04-08 11:40:03 UTC) yields the elapsed span between the two PCA records:

\[\text{2026-04-08 11:40:03.043 UTC} - \text{2026-04-08 11:37:07.600 UTC} = 175.443\text{ seconds}\]

This window between the two 7zFM.exe PCA entries reflects active GUI archiving/staging prior to the operator opening a terminal and moving to cleanup.

  • Initial 7zFM.exe PCA Timestamp: 2026-04-08 11:37:07 UTC
  • Elapsed Span Between 7zFM.exe PCA Entries: 175.443 seconds (~2 minutes, 55 seconds)

    4. Command-Line Execution & Anti-Forensic Cleanup (Eraser)

Right after 7zFM.exe was evaluated, PcaAppLaunchDic.txt records WindowsTerminal.exe at 2026-04-08 11:40:16 UTC, giving the operator a command-line shell (such as for running rclone commands). Shortly thereafter, the logs show the Eraser installer and installed utility hinting a activity to delete traces of evidence.

  • 2026-04-08 11:42:11 UTC: C:\Users\cyberjunkie\Downloads\Eraser 6.2.0.2996.exe (Installer executed)
  • 2026-04-08 11:43:38 UTC: C:\Program Files\Eraser\Eraser.exe (Installed utility executed)

Eraser Installer and Eraser.exe Execution in PCA Logs

Analyst Takeaway — Detecting Anti-Forensics via PCA Logs

Eraser is a legitimate security tool designed to overwrite sensitive files on disk using multi-pass wiping patterns so they cannot be recovered via traditional file carving. When observed immediately after archiving (7zFM.exe) and cloud-transfer (rclone.exe) activity, Eraser.exe is a strong indicator of defense evasion / indicator removal (MITRE ATT&CK T1070.004) aimed at destroying staged archives, configuration files (rclone.conf), and downloaded binaries. Crucially, even if Eraser wiped those files from the file system, PCA retained the execution trail.

Consolidated Minimal Incident Timeline (2026-04-08)

Timestamp (UTC) Artifact Source Executable Path Event / Forensic Significance
2026-04-08 10:12:30.451 PcaAppLaunchDic.txt ...\WindowsTerminal.exe Earlier Windows Terminal activity on host.
2026-04-08 10:33:11.997 PcaAppLaunchDic.txt ...\Notepad.exe Notepad activity prior to tooling deployment.
2026-04-08 11:30:26.117 PcaGeneralDb0.txt %USERPROFILE%\Downloads\7z2600-x64.exe Initial 7-Zip installer launch; abnormal exit (0x1).
2026-04-08 11:30:26.150 PcaGeneralDb0.txt %USERPROFILE%\Downloads\7z2600-x64.exe PCA logged Installer failed (Type 0).
2026-04-08 11:30:37.758 PcaAppLaunchDic.txt C:\Users\cyberjunkie\Downloads\7z2600-x64.exe Second launch of 7-Zip installer.
2026-04-08 11:30:39.242 PcaGeneralDb0.txt %USERPROFILE%\Downloads\7z2600-x64.exe PCA resolve is called (Type 3); installation completed.
2026-04-08 11:32:00.303 PcaAppLaunchDic.txt C:\Users\cyberjunkie\Downloads\rclone-v1.73.3-windows-amd64\rclone.exe Rclone cloud-sync utility executed from Downloads.
2026-04-08 11:32:08.187 PcaGeneralDb0.txt %USERPROFILE%\Downloads\rclone-v1.73.3-windows-amd64\rclone.exe Rclone exited abnormally (0x1) / terminated (Type 2).
2026-04-08 11:32:08.517 PcaGeneralDb0.txt %USERPROFILE%\Downloads\rclone-v1.73.3-windows-amd64\rclone.exe PCA resolve is called (Type 3).
2026-04-08 11:37:07.600 PcaAppLaunchDic.txt C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7zFM.exe 7-Zip File Manager (GUI) launched; data archiving begins.
2026-04-08 11:40:03.043 PcaGeneralDb0.txt %programfiles%\7-Zip\7zFM.exe PCA resolve is called (Type 3); 175.443s after initial 7zFM.exe entry.
2026-04-08 11:40:16.828 PcaAppLaunchDic.txt ...\WindowsTerminal.exe Windows Terminal launched (likely for CLI rclone exfiltration).
2026-04-08 11:42:11.726 PcaAppLaunchDic.txt C:\Users\cyberjunkie\Downloads\Eraser 6.2.0.2996.exe Eraser secure-deletion setup utility executed.
2026-04-08 11:43:38.671 PcaAppLaunchDic.txt C:\Program Files\Eraser\Eraser.exe Installed Eraser utility executed to wipe local traces.
2026-04-08 12:00:25.475 PcaAppLaunchDic.txt C:\Users\cyberjunkie\Desktop\KAPE\gkape.exe KAPE forensic collection GUI launched on Desktop.

To transition from this minimal PCA timeline to a full incident scope, subsequent investigation should prioritize:

  1. Authentication & Remote Access Logs: Review Security.evtx (Event IDs 4624 Type 10/3, 4625) and Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager/Operational.evtx (Event ID 1149) to identify the source IP address of the unauthorized RDP session.
  2. File System & Deletion Artifacts: Parse $MFT, $UsnJrnl, and Windows Prefetch (C:\Windows\Prefetch\) to identify created/deleted .7z or .zip archives, verify rclone.conf remnants, and determine which files were targeted by Eraser.exe.
  3. Network & Cloud Exfiltration Telemetry: Check proxy logs, firewall flow logs, or DNS cache/client logs for outbound connections to cloud storage APIs (e.g., MEGA, Google Drive, S3) around 11:40–11:42 UTC.