Executive Summary
Following indicators of a credential compromise and unauthorized remote access (RDP) targeting a QA Engineer’s Windows 11 workstation, a preliminary forensic triage was conducted using Program Compatibility Assistant (PCA) execution artifacts located in C:\Windows\appcompat\pca\.
Analysis of PcaAppLaunchDic.txt and PcaGeneralDb0.txt identified a concentrated post-exploitation activity window on 2026-04-08 between 11:30:26 UTC and 11:43:38 UTC under the user profile cyberjunkie. Within this 13-minute window, an unauthorized operator downloaded and installed 7-Zip (7z2600-x64.exe), staged/executed Rclone (rclone.exe), interactively launched the 7-Zip File Manager (7zFM.exe) to archive files, opened Windows Terminal (WindowsTerminal.exe), and subsequently installed and ran Eraser (Eraser.exe) to securely wipe local traces.
Background & Artifact Overview: Windows Program Compatibility Assistant (PCA)
What are PCA Logs?
The Program Compatibility Assistant (
PcaSvc) is a built-in Windows service designed to detect and mitigate compatibility issues when applications run on modern versions of Windows. Starting in Windows 10 and continuing in Windows 11, Windows writes plain-text execution telemetry toC:\Windows\appcompat\pca\. Because these files persist independently of Windows Event Logs and Prefetch, they frequently preserve proof of program execution even after an attacker deletes their binaries or attempts anti-forensic cleanup.n
Three primary files reside in C:\Windows\appcompat\pca\:
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt: A pipe-delimited (|) dictionary mapping full executable paths to their last recorded UTC execution/event timestamp.PcaGeneralDb0.txt: A pipe-delimited database recording detailed execution events, including record type codes, PE version metadata (Product Name, Company Name, Product Version), a PCA Program ID, and exit/resolver status messages.PcaGeneralDb1.txt: A secondary/rotated database sharing the exact same schema asPcaGeneralDb0.txt. BothDb0andDb1should always be parsed together to ensure complete coverage.Forensic Analysis & Findings
1. Deployment of File Archiving Utility
Examination of PcaAppLaunchDic.txt revealed that an installer for 7-Zip (7z2600-x64.exe) was staged in the user’s Downloads directory and executed on 2026-04-08 11:30:37

Correlating this binary in PcaGeneralDb0.txt shows how the installation unfolded across three distinct records:
2026-04-08 11:30:26.117 UTC(Type2):7z2600-x64.exeloggedAbnormal process exit with code 0x1—a non-zero exit code indicating the initial installer run terminated prematurely or encountered an error.2026-04-08 11:30:26.150 UTC(Type0): 33 milliseconds later, PCA recordedInstaller failed.2026-04-08 11:30:39.242 UTC(Type3): Following a second execution recorded inPcaAppLaunchDic.txtat11:30:37.758 UTC, PCA loggedPCA resolve is called, resolver name: DetectorShim_KernelDriver, result: 0, confirming Windows evaluated the successful second run of the installer.

With 7-Zip installed at 11:30:39 UTC, the next step in the activity window was staging a tool capable of moving data off the host.
What Does “PCA Resolve is Called” Mean?
When
PcaSvclogsPCA resolve is called(Type 3) withDetectorShim_KernelDriverandresult: 0, Windows’ compatibility engine has evaluated the binary against built-in compatibility detectors/shims without internal error (0=STATUS_SUCCESS). In DFIR timelines,Type 3entries serve as reliable corroborating evidence of program execution around the logged timestamp.
2. Staging of Cloud Exfiltration Utility
Shortly after the 7-zip installation, logs indicate the execution of rclone.exe at 11:32:00, from an extracted archive folder inside Downloads, followed by WindowsTerminal.exe at 11:40:16, 7zFM.exe at 11:37:07 and the Eraser Binary:

Rather than running in a single automated script, the attacker appears to have interactively staged tools under the Downloads folder and tested or launched them manually during the session. Notice also that PcaAppLaunchDic.txt lists entries in the order PCA last updated/wrote them rather than strictly sorted by timestamp (for instance, WindowsTerminal.exe at 11:40:16 appears above 7zFM.exe at 11:37:07), which is why analysts should always sort by timestamp when reconstructing an event sequence while keeping in mind that PcaAppLaunchDic.txt tracks the last recorded launch time for each path.
Why
rclone.exeis a High-Priority DFIR Indicator
rclone.exeis the binary for Rclone, a legitimate open-source command-line tool designed to sync, copy, and transfer files between local directories and cloud storage providers (such as MEGA, Google Drive, OneDrive, and AWS S3). Threat actors routinely abuse Rclone for data exfiltration because outbound HTTPS traffic to reputable cloud storage endpoints blends easily with legitimate enterprise network traffic.
Looking closely at %USERPROFILE%\Downloads\rclone-v1.73.3-windows-amd64\rclone.exe (product rclone, version 1.73.3) in PcaGeneralDb0.txt shows two entries at 11:32:08 UTC:
2026-04-08 11:32:08 UTC(Type2):Abnormal process exit with code 0x12026-04-08 11:32:08 UTC(Type3):PCA resolve is called, resolver name: DetectorShim_KernelDriver, result: 0
Because Rclone is a command-line utility, invoking it without proper CLI arguments or terminating/killing the process produces a non-zero exit (0x1) at 2026-04-08 11:32:08 UTC. Once the Rclone binary was in place, the session shifted to gathering and archiving files.
3. Data Collection & Archiving via 7zFM.exe
Following the initial Rclone execution, C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7zFM.exe appears at 11:37:07, and PcaGeneralDb0.txt records a Type 3 (PCA resolve is called) entry for %programfiles%\7-Zip\7zFM.exe at 11:40:03:

This highlights the rclone.exe entries at 11:32:08 alongside the later 7zFM.exe PCA resolve at 11:40:03. The embedded PE metadata confirms legitimate product and publisher strings for both tools, rclone (https://rclone.org, version 1.73.3) and 7-zip (igor pavlov, version 26.00), ruling out simple binary renaming on those executables and showing that interactive archiving was evaluated right before the command-line activity that followed.
Interactive Archiving (
7zFM.exevs.7z.exe)Unlike
7z.exe(the command-line archiver typically favored in automated scripts),7zFM.exeis the graphical user interface (GUI) file manager. Its presence points toward an operator interactively browsing directories over RDP and compressing target files into an archive, reducing transfer size and bundling sensitive data prior to exfiltration.
Temporal Proximity Analysis
Comparing the initial PcaAppLaunchDic.txt entry for 7zFM.exe (2026-04-08 11:37:07 UTC) against its subsequent PcaGeneralDb0.txt entry (2026-04-08 11:40:03 UTC) yields the elapsed span between the two PCA records:
This window between the two 7zFM.exe PCA entries reflects active GUI archiving/staging prior to the operator opening a terminal and moving to cleanup.
- Initial
7zFM.exePCA Timestamp:2026-04-08 11:37:07 UTC - Elapsed Span Between
7zFM.exePCA Entries:175.443seconds (~2 minutes, 55 seconds)4. Command-Line Execution & Anti-Forensic Cleanup (
Eraser)
Right after 7zFM.exe was evaluated, PcaAppLaunchDic.txt records WindowsTerminal.exe at 2026-04-08 11:40:16 UTC, giving the operator a command-line shell (such as for running rclone commands). Shortly thereafter, the logs show the Eraser installer and installed utility hinting a activity to delete traces of evidence.
2026-04-08 11:42:11 UTC:C:\Users\cyberjunkie\Downloads\Eraser 6.2.0.2996.exe(Installer executed)2026-04-08 11:43:38 UTC:C:\Program Files\Eraser\Eraser.exe(Installed utility executed)

Analyst Takeaway — Detecting Anti-Forensics via PCA Logs
Eraser is a legitimate security tool designed to overwrite sensitive files on disk using multi-pass wiping patterns so they cannot be recovered via traditional file carving. When observed immediately after archiving (
7zFM.exe) and cloud-transfer (rclone.exe) activity,Eraser.exeis a strong indicator of defense evasion / indicator removal (MITRE ATT&CK T1070.004) aimed at destroying staged archives, configuration files (rclone.conf), and downloaded binaries. Crucially, even if Eraser wiped those files from the file system, PCA retained the execution trail.
Consolidated Minimal Incident Timeline (2026-04-08)
| Timestamp (UTC) | Artifact Source | Executable Path | Event / Forensic Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
2026-04-08 10:12:30.451 |
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
...\WindowsTerminal.exe |
Earlier Windows Terminal activity on host. |
2026-04-08 10:33:11.997 |
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
...\Notepad.exe |
Notepad activity prior to tooling deployment. |
2026-04-08 11:30:26.117 |
PcaGeneralDb0.txt |
%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\7z2600-x64.exe |
Initial 7-Zip installer launch; abnormal exit (0x1). |
2026-04-08 11:30:26.150 |
PcaGeneralDb0.txt |
%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\7z2600-x64.exe |
PCA logged Installer failed (Type 0). |
2026-04-08 11:30:37.758 |
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
C:\Users\cyberjunkie\Downloads\7z2600-x64.exe |
Second launch of 7-Zip installer. |
2026-04-08 11:30:39.242 |
PcaGeneralDb0.txt |
%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\7z2600-x64.exe |
PCA resolve is called (Type 3); installation completed. |
2026-04-08 11:32:00.303 |
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
C:\Users\cyberjunkie\Downloads\rclone-v1.73.3-windows-amd64\rclone.exe |
Rclone cloud-sync utility executed from Downloads. |
2026-04-08 11:32:08.187 |
PcaGeneralDb0.txt |
%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\rclone-v1.73.3-windows-amd64\rclone.exe |
Rclone exited abnormally (0x1) / terminated (Type 2). |
2026-04-08 11:32:08.517 |
PcaGeneralDb0.txt |
%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\rclone-v1.73.3-windows-amd64\rclone.exe |
PCA resolve is called (Type 3). |
2026-04-08 11:37:07.600 |
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7zFM.exe |
7-Zip File Manager (GUI) launched; data archiving begins. |
2026-04-08 11:40:03.043 |
PcaGeneralDb0.txt |
%programfiles%\7-Zip\7zFM.exe |
PCA resolve is called (Type 3); 175.443s after initial 7zFM.exe entry. |
2026-04-08 11:40:16.828 |
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
...\WindowsTerminal.exe |
Windows Terminal launched (likely for CLI rclone exfiltration). |
2026-04-08 11:42:11.726 |
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
C:\Users\cyberjunkie\Downloads\Eraser 6.2.0.2996.exe |
Eraser secure-deletion setup utility executed. |
2026-04-08 11:43:38.671 |
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
C:\Program Files\Eraser\Eraser.exe |
Installed Eraser utility executed to wipe local traces. |
2026-04-08 12:00:25.475 |
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
C:\Users\cyberjunkie\Desktop\KAPE\gkape.exe |
KAPE forensic collection GUI launched on Desktop. |
Recommended Next Steps for Deep-Dive Analysis
To transition from this minimal PCA timeline to a full incident scope, subsequent investigation should prioritize:
- Authentication & Remote Access Logs: Review
Security.evtx(Event IDs4624Type 10/3,4625) andMicrosoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager/Operational.evtx(Event ID1149) to identify the source IP address of the unauthorized RDP session. - File System & Deletion Artifacts: Parse
$MFT,$UsnJrnl, and Windows Prefetch (C:\Windows\Prefetch\) to identify created/deleted.7zor.ziparchives, verifyrclone.confremnants, and determine which files were targeted byEraser.exe. - Network & Cloud Exfiltration Telemetry: Check proxy logs, firewall flow logs, or DNS cache/client logs for outbound connections to cloud storage APIs (e.g., MEGA, Google Drive, S3) around
11:40–11:42 UTC.